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We review and synthesize recent neurophysiological studies of decision making in humans and nonhuman
primates. From these studies, the basic outline of the neurobiological mechanism for primate choice is begin-
ning to emerge. The identifiedmechanism is now known to include amulticomponent valuation stage, imple-
mented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and associated parts of striatum, and a choice stage, implemented
in lateral prefrontal and parietal areas. Neurobiological studies of decision making are beginning to enhance
our understanding of economic and social behavior as well as our understanding of significant health disor-
ders where people’s behavior plays a key role.Introduction
Only seven years have passed since Neuron published a special
issue entitled ‘‘Reward and Decision,’’ an event that signaled
a surge of interest in the neural mechanisms underlying decision
making that continues to this day (Cohen and Blum, 2002). At the
time, many scholars were excited that quantitative formal models
of choice behavior—from economics, evolutionary biology,
computer science, and mathematical psychology—were begin-
ning to provide a fruitful framework for new and more detailed
investigations of the neural mechanisms of choice. To borrow
David Marr’s (1982) famous typology for computational studies
of the brain, decision scholars seemed for the first time poised
to investigate decision making at the theoretical, algorithmic,
and implementation levels simultaneously.
Since that time, hundreds of research papers have been
published on the neural mechanisms of decision making, at least
two new societies dedicated to the topic have been formed (the
Society for Neuroeconomics and the Association for NeuroPsy-
choEconomics), and a basic textbook for the field has been
introduced (Glimcher et al., 2009). In this review, we survey
some of the scientific progress that has been made in these
past seven years, focusing specifically on neurophysiological
studies in primates and including closely related work in humans.
In an effort to achieve brevity, we have been selective. Our aim is
to provide one synthesis of the neurophysiology of decision
making, as we understand it. While many issues remain to be
resolved, our conviction is that the available data suggest the
basic outlines of the neural systems that algorithmically produce
choice. Although there are certainly vigorous controversies, we
believe that most scientists in the field would exhibit consensus
over (at least) the terrain of contemporary debate.
The Basic Mechanism
Any neural model of decision making needs to answer two key
questions. First, how are the subjective values of the various
options under consideration learned, stored, and represented?
Second, how is a single highly valued action chosen from among
the options under consideration to be implemented by the motorcircuitry? Below, we review evidence that we interpret as sug-
gesting that valuation involves the ventromedial sectors of the
prefrontal cortex and associated parts of the striatum (likely as
a final common path funneling information from many ante-
cedent areas), while choice involves lateral prefrontal and pari-
etal areas traditionally viewed as intermediate regions in the
sensory-motor hierarchy. Based on these data, we argue that
a ‘‘basic model’’ for primate decision making is emerging from
recent investigations, which involves the coordinated action of
these two circuits in a two-stage algorithm.
Before proceeding, we should be clear about the relationship
between this neurophysiological model of choice and the very
similar theoretical models in economics from which it is derived.
Traditional economic models aim only to predict (or explain) an
individual’s observable choices. They do not seek to explain
the (putatively unobservable) process by which those choices
are generated. In the famous terminology of Milton Friedman,
traditional economic models are conceived of as being ‘‘as if’’
models (Friedman, 1953). Classic proofs in utility theory (i.e.,
Samuelson, 1937), for example, demonstrate that any decision
maker who chooses in a mathematically consistent fashion
behaves as if they had first constructed and stored a single list
of the all possible options ordered from best to worst, and then
in a second step had selected the highest ordered of those avail-
able options. Friedman and nearly all of the neoclassical econo-
mists who followed him were explicit that the concept of utility
was not meant to apply to anything about the algorithmic or
implementation levels. For Friedman, and for many contempo-
rary economists (i.e., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008), whether or
not there are ‘‘neurophysiological correlates of utility’’ is, by
construction, irrelevant.
Neurophysiological models, of course, aim to explain the
mechanisms by which choices are generated, as well as the
choices themselves. These models seek to explain both behavior
and its causes and employ constraints at the algorithmic level to
validate the plausibility of behavioral predictions. One might call
these models, which are concerned with algorithm and imple-
mentation as well as with behavior, because models. AlthoughNeuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 733
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usefulness of because models, we take as a given for the
purposes of this review that describing the mechanism of primate
(both human and nonhuman) decision making will yield new
insights into behavior, just as studies of the primate visual system
have revolutionized our understanding of perception.
Stage 1: Valuation
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex and Striatum: A Final
Common Path
Most decision theories—from expected utility theory in
economics (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) to prospect
theory in psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to rein-
forcement learning theories in computer science (Sutton and
Barto, 1998)—share a core conclusion. Decision makers inte-
grate the various dimensions of an option into a single measure
of its idiosyncratic subjective value and then choose the option
that is most valuable. Comparisons between different kinds of
options rely on this abstract measure of subjective value,
a kind of ‘‘common currency’’ for choice. That humans can in
fact compare apples to oranges when they buy fruit is evidence
for this abstract common scale.
At first blush, the notion that all options can be represented
on a single scale of desirability might strike some as a peculiar
idea. Intuitively it might feel like complicated choices among
objects with many different attributes would resist reduction to
a single dimension of desirability. However, as Samuelson
showed over half a century ago (Samuelson, 1937), any individual
whose choices can be described as internally consistent can be
perfectly modeled by algorithms that employ a single common
scale of desirability. If someone selects an apple when they
could have had an orange, and an orange when they could
have had a pear, then (assuming they are in the same state)
they should not select a pear when they could have had an ap-
ple instead. This is the core notion of consistency, and when
people behave in this manner, we can model their choices as
arising from a single, consistent ‘‘utility’’ ordering over all possible
options.
For traditional economic theories, however, consistent deci-
sion makers only choose as if they employed a single hidden
common currency for comparing options. There was no claim
when these theories were first advanced that subjective repre-
sentations of value were used at the algorithmic level during
choice. However, there is now growing evidence that subjective
value representations do in fact play a role at the neural algo-
rithmic level and that these representations are encoded primarily
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum (Figure 1).
One set of studies has documented responses in orbitofrontal
cortex related to the subjective values of different rewards, or in
the language of economics, ‘‘goods.’’ Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad (2006) recorded from area 13 of the orbitofrontal cortex
while monkeys chose between pairs of juices. The amount of
each type of juice offered to the animals varied from trial to trial,
and the types of juices offered changed across sessions. Based
on each monkey’s actual choices, they calculated a subjective
value for each juice reward, based on type and quantity of juice,
which could explain these choices as resulting from a common
value scale. They then searched for neurons that showed734 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.evidence of this hypothesized common scale for subjective
value. They found three dominant patterns of responding, which
accounted for 80% of the neuronal responses in this region. First
and most importantly they identified offer value neurons, cells
with firing rates that were linearly correlated with the subjective
value of one of the offered rewards, as computed from behavior
(Figure 2). Second, they observed chosen value neurons, which
tracked the subjective value of the chosen reward in a single
common currency that was independent of type of juice. Finally,
they observed taste neurons, which showed a categorical
response when a particular juice was chosen. All of these
responses were independent of the spatial arrangement of the
stimuli and of the motor response produced by the animal to
make its choice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, offer value and chosen
value responses were prominent right after the options were pre-
sented and again at the time of juice receipt. Taste responses, in
contrast, occurred primarily after the juice was received.
Based on their timing and properties, these different responses
likely play different roles during choice. Offer value signals could
serve as subjective values, in a single common neuronal
currency, for comparing and deciding between offers. They are
exactly the kind of value representation posited by most decision
theories, and they could be analogous to what economists
call ‘‘utilities’’ (or, if they also responded to probabilistically
delivered rewards to ‘‘expected utilities’’) and to what psycholo-
gists call ‘‘decision utilities.’’ Chosen values, by contrast, can
only be calculated after a choice has been made and, thus,
could not be the basis for a decision. As discussed in the section
below, however, learning the value of an action from experience
depends on being able to compare two quantities—the
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Figure 1. Valuation Circuitry
Diagram of a macaque brain, highlighting in black the regions discussed as
playing role in valuation. Other regions are labeled in gray.
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Figure 2. An Example Orbitofrontal Neuron that Encodes Offer Value, in a Menu-Invariant and Therefore Transitive Manner
(A) In red is the firing rate of the neuron (±SEM), as a function of the magnitude of the two juices offered, for three different choice pairs. In black is the percentage
of time the monkey chose the first offer.
(B) Replots firing rates as a function of the offer value of juice C, demonstrating that this neuron encodes this value in a common currency in a manner that is
independent of the other reward offered. The different symbols and colors refer to data from the three different juice pairs, and each symbol represents one trial
type. Reprinted with permission from Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008).forecasted value of taking an action and the actual value experi-
enced when that action was taken. Chosen value responses in
the orbitofrontal cortex may then signal the forecast, or for
neurons active very late in the choice process the experienced,
subjective value from that choice (see also Takahashi et al.,
2009, for discussion of this potential function of orbitofrontal
value representations).
In a follow-up study, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008)
extended their conclusion that these neurons provide utility-
like representations. They demonstrated that orbitofrontal
responses were ‘‘menu invariant’’—that activity was internally
consistent in the same way that the choices of the monkeys
were internally consistent. In that study, choice pairs involving
three different kinds of juice were interleaved from trial to trial.
Behaviorally, the monkeys’ choices obeyed transitivity: if the
animal preferred apple juice over grape juice, and grape juice
over tea, then he also preferred apple juice over tea. They
observed the same three kinds of neuronal responses as in
their previous study, and these responses did not depend on
the other option offered on that trial (Figure 2). For example,
a neuron that encoded the offer value of grape juice did so in
the same manner whether the other option was apple juice or
tea. This independence can be shown to be required of utility-
like representations (Houthakker, 1950) and thus strengthens
the conclusion that these neurons may encode a common
currency for choice.
Importantly, Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008) distinguished
the ‘‘menu invariance’’ that they observed, where neuronal
responses do not change from trial to trial as the other juice
offered changes, from a longer-term kind of stability they refer
to as ‘‘condition invariance.’’ Tremblay and Schultz’s (1999)
data suggest that orbitofrontal responses may not be ‘‘condition
invariant,’’ since these responses seem to adjust to the range of
rewards when this range is stable over long blocks of trials. As
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008) argued, such longer-term
rescaling would serve the adaptive function of allowing orbito-
frontal neurons to adjust across conditions so as to encode value
across their entire dynamic range. However, in discussing thisstudy and the ones below, we focus primarily on the question
of whether neuronal responses are ‘‘menu invariant,’’ i.e.,
whether they adjust dynamically from trial to trial depending on
what other options are offered.
Another set of studies from two labs has documented similar
responses in the striatum, the second area that appears to repre-
sent the subjective values of choice options. Lau and Glimcher
(2008) recorded from the caudate nucleus while monkeys per-
formed an oculomotor choice task (Figure 3A). The task was
based on the concurrent variable-interval schedules used to
study Herrnstein’s matching law (Herrnstein, 1961; Platt and
Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004). Behaviorally, the monkeys
dynamically adjusted the proportion of their responses to each
target to match the relative magnitudes of the rewards earned
for looking at those targets. Recording from phasically active
striatal neurons (PANs), they found three kinds of task-related
responses closely related to the orbitofrontal signals of Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad (2006, 2008): action value neurons, which
tracked the value of one of the actions, independent of whether
it was chosen; chosen value neurons, which tracked the value of
a chosen action; and choice neurons, which produced a categor-
ical response when a particular action was taken. Action value
responses occurred primarily early in the trial, at the time of the
monkey’s choice, while chosen value responses occurred later
in the trial, near the time of reward receipt.
Samejima and colleagues (2005) provided important impetus
for all of these studies when they gathered some of the first
evidence that the subjective value of actions was encoded on
a common scale (Figure 3B). In that study, monkeys performed
a manual choice task, turning a lever leftward or rightward to
obtain rewards. Across different blocks, the probability that
each turn would be rewarded with a large (as opposed to a small)
magnitude of juice was changed. Recording from the putamen,
they found that one-third of all modulated neurons tracked
action value. This was almost exactly the same percentage of
action value neurons that Lau and Glimcher (2008) later found
in the oculomotor caudate. Samejima and colleagues’ design
also allowed them to show that these responses did not dependNeuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 735
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a neuron that tracked the value of a right turn would always
exhibit an intermediate response when that action yielded a
large reward with 50% probability, independent of whether
the left turn was more (i.e., 90% probability) or less (i.e., 10%
probability) valuable. This is critical because it means that the
striatal signals, like the signals in orbitofrontal cortex, likely
show the kind of consistent representation required for transitive
behavior.
Thus, the responses in the caudate and putamen in these
two studies mirror those found in orbitofrontal cortex, except
anchored to the actions produced by the animals rather than
to a more abstract goods-based framework as observed in
orbitofrontal cortex. One key question raised by these findings
is the relationship between the action-based value responses
observed in the striatum and the goods-based value responses
observed in the orbitofrontal cortex. The extent to which these
representations are independent has received much attention
recently. For example, Horwitz and colleagues (2004) have
shown that asking monkeys to choose between ‘‘goods’’ that
map arbitrarily to different actions from trial to trial leads almost
instantaneously to activity in action-based choice circuits.
Findings such as these suggest that action-based and goods-
based representations of value are profoundly interconnected,
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Figure 3. Two Example Striatal Neurons that Encode Action Value
(A) Caudate neuron that fires more when a contralateral saccade is more valu-
able (blue) compared to less valuable (yellow), independently of which
saccade the animal eventually chooses. c denotes the average onset of the
saccade cue, and the thin lines represent ±1 SEM. Reprinted with permission
from Lau and Glimcher (2008).
(B) Putamen neuron that encodes the value of a rightward arm movement (QR),
independent of the value of a leftward arm movement (QL). Reprinted with
permission from Samejima et al. (2005).736 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.although we acknowledge that this view remains controversial
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008).
Human imaging studies have provided strong converging
evidence that ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum
encode the subjective value of goods and actions. While it is
difficult to determine whether the single-unit neurophysiology
and fMRI studies have identified directly homologous subregions
of these larger anatomical structures in the two different species,
there is surprising agreement across the two methods concern-
ing the larger anatomical structures important in valuation. As
reviewed elsewhere, dozens of studies have demonstrated
reward responses in these regions that are consistent with
tracking forecasted or experienced value, which might play
a role in value learning (Delgado, 2007; Knutson and Cooper,
2005; O’Doherty, 2004). Here, we will focus on several recent
studies that identified subjective value signals specific to the
decision process. Two key design aspects that allow this identi-
fication in these particular studies are (1) no outcomes were
experienced during the experiment, so that decision-related
signals could be separated from learning-related signals as
much as possible, and (2) there was a behavioral measure of
the subject’s preference, which allowed subjective value to be
distinguished from the objective characteristics of the options.
Plassmann and colleagues (2007) scanned hungry subjects
bidding on various snack foods (Figure 4). They used an auction
procedure where subjects were strongly incentivized to report
what each snack food was actually worth to them. They found
that BOLD activity in medial orbitofrontal cortex was correlated
with the subject’s subjective valuation of that item (Figures 4B
and 4C). Hare and colleagues have now replicated this finding
twice, once in a different task where the subjective value of the
good could be dissociated from other possible signals (Hare
et al., 2008) and again in a set of dieting subjects where the
subjective value of the snack foods was affected by both taste
and health concerns (Hare et al., 2009).
In a related study, Kable and Glimcher (2007) examined partic-
ipants choosing between immediate and delayed monetary
rewards. The immediate reward was fixed, while both the magni-
tude and receipt time of the delayed reward varied across trials.
From each subject’s choices, an idiosyncratic discount function
was estimated that described how the subjective value of money
declined with delay for that individual. In medial prefrontal cortex
and ventral striatum (among other regions), BOLD activity was
correlated with the subjective value of the delayed reward as
it varied across trials. Furthermore, across subjects, the neuro-
metric discount functions describing how neural activity in these
regions declined with delay matched the psychometric discount
functions describing how subjective value declined with delay
(Figure 5). In other words, for more impulsive subjects, neural
activity in these regions decreased steeply as delay increased,
while for more patient subjects this decline was less pro-
nounced. These results suggest that neural activity in these
regions encodes the subjective value of both immediate and de-
layed rewards in a common neural currency that takes into
account the time at which a reward will occur.
Two recent studies have focused on decisions involving
monetary gambles. These studies have demonstrated that
modulation of a common value signal could also account for
Neuron
Reviewloss aversion and ambiguity aversion, two more recently identi-
fied choice-related behaviors that suggest important refine-
ments to theoretical models of subjective value encoding (for
a review of these issues see Fox and Poldrack, 2009). Tom
and colleagues (2007) scanned subjects deciding whether to
accept or reject monetary lotteries in which there was a 50/50
chance of gaining or losing money. They found that BOLD
activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum increased
with the amount of the gain and decreased with the amount
of the loss. Furthermore, the size of the loss effect relative to
the gain effect was correlated with the degree to which the
potential loss affected the person’s choice more than the poten-
tial gain. Activity decreased faster in response to increasing
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Figure 5. Match between Psychometric and Neurometric Estimates of Subjective Value during Intertemporal Choice
(A) Regions of interest are shown for one subject, in striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex.
(B) Activity in these ROIs (black) decreases as the delay to a reward increases, in a similar manner to the way that subjective value estimated behaviorally (red)
decreases as a function of delay. This decline in value can be captured by estimating a discount rate (k). Error bars represent standard errors.
(C) Comparison between discount rates estimated separately from the behavioral and neural data across all subjects, showing that on average there is a psycho-
metric-neurometric match. Reprinted with permission from Kable and Glimcher (2007).
Figure 4. Orbitofrontal Cortex Encodes the
Subjective Value of Food Rewards
in Humans
(A) Hungry subjects bid on snack foods, which
were the only items they could eat for 30 min after
the experiment. At the time of the decision, medial
orbitofrontal cortex (B) tracked the subjective
value that subjects placed on each food item.
Activity here increased as the subjects’ willingness
to pay for the item increased (C). Error bars denote
standard errors. Reprinted with permission from
Plassmann et al. (2007).
losses for more loss-averse subjects.
Levy and colleagues (2007) examined
subjects choosing between a fixed cer-
tain amount and a gamble that was either
risky (known probabilities) or ambiguous
(unknown probabilities). They found that
activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum was corre-
lated with the subjective value of both risky and ambiguous
options.
Midbrain Dopamine: A Mechanism for Learning
Subjective Value
The previous section reviewed evidence that ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and striatum encode the subjective value of
different goods or actions during decision making in a way that
could guide choice. But how do these subjective value signals
arise? One of the most critical sources of value information is
undoubtedly past experience. Indeed, in physiological experi-
ments, animal subjects always have to learn the value of different
actions over the course of the experiment—for these subjects,Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 737
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Reviewthe consequences of each action cannot be communicated
linguistically. Although there are alternative viewpoints (Dommett
et al., 2005; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006), unusually solid
evidence now indicates that dopaminergic neurons in the
midbrain encode a teaching signal that can be used to learn
the subjective value of actions (for a detailed review, including
a discussion of how nearly all of the findings often presented
as discrepant with early versions of the dopaminergic teaching
signal hypothesis have been reconciled with contemporary
versions of the theory, see Niv and Montague, 2009). Indeed,
these kinds of signals can be shown to be sufficient for learning
the values of different actions from experience. Since these
same dopaminergic neurons project primarily to prefrontal and
striatal regions (Haber, 2003), it seems likely that these neurons
play a critical role in subjective value learning.
The computational framework for these investigations of
dopamine and learning comes from reinforcement learning
theories developed in computer science and psychology over
the past two decades (Niv and Montague, 2009). While several
variants of these theories exist, in all of these models, subjective
values are learned through iterative updating based on experi-
ence. The theories rest on the idea that each time a subject
experiences the outcome of her choice, an updated value
estimate is calculated from the old value estimate and a reward
prediction error—the difference between the experienced
outcome of an action and the outcome that was forecast. This
reward prediction error is scaled by a learning rate, which deter-
mines the weight given to recent versus remote experience.
Pioneering studies of Schultz and colleagues (1997) provided
the initial evidence that dopaminergic neurons encode a reward
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Figure 6. Dopaminergic Responses in
Monkeys and Humans
(A) An example dopamine neuron recorded in
a monkey, which responds more when the reward
received was better than expected.
(B) Firing rates of dopaminergic neurons track
positive reward prediction errors.
(C) Population average of dopaminergic responses
(n = 15) recorded in humans during deep-brain
stimulation (DBS) surgery for Parkinson’s disease,
showing increased firing in response to unex-
pected gains. The red line indicates feedback
onset.
(D) Firing rates of dopaminergic neurons depend
on the size and valence of the difference between
the received and expected reward. All error bars
represent standard errors.
Panels (A) and (B) reprinted with permission from
Bayer and Glimcher (2005), and panels (C) and
(D) reprinted with permission from Zaghloul et al.
(2009).
prediction error signal of the kind
proposed by a class of theories called
temporal-difference learning (TD-models;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). These studies
demonstrated that, during conditioning
tasks, dopaminergic neurons (1) re-
sponded to the receipt of unexpected
rewards, (2) responded to the first reliable
predictor of reward after conditioning, (3) did not respond to the
receipt of fully predicted rewards, and (4) showed a decrease in
firing when a predicted reward was omitted. Montague et al.
(1996) were the first to propose that this pattern of results could
be completely explained if the firing of dopamine neurons en-
coded a reward prediction error of the type required by TD-class
models. Subsequent studies, examining different Pavlovian
conditioning paradigms, demonstrated that the qualitative
responses of dopaminergic neurons were entirely consistent
with this hypothesis (Tobler et al., 2003; Waelti et al., 2001).
Recent studies have provided more quantitative tests of the
reward prediction error hypothesis. Bayer and Glimcher (2005)
recorded from dopaminergic neurons during an oculomotor
task, in which the reward received for the same movement varied
in a continuous manner from trial to trial. As is required by theory,
the response on the current trial was a function of an exponen-
tially weighted sum of previous rewards obtained by the monkey.
Thus, dopaminergic firing rates were linearly related to a model-
derived reward prediction error (Figures 6A and 6B). Interest-
ingly, though, this relationship broke down for the most negative
prediction error signals, although the implications of this last
finding have been controversial.
Additional studies have demonstrated that, when conditioned
cues predict rewards with different magnitudes or probabilities,
the cue-elicited dopaminergic response scales with magnitude
or probability, as expected if it represents a cue-elicited
prediction error (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). In
a similar manner, if different cues predict rewards after different
delays, the cue-elicited response decreases as the delay to
reward increases, consistent with a prediction that incorporates738 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Reviewdiscounting of future rewards (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi and
Schultz, 2008; Roesch et al., 2007).
Until recently, direct evidence regarding the activity of
dopaminergic neurons in humans has been scant. Imaging the
midbrain with fMRI is difficult for several technical reasons,
and the reward prediction error signals initially identified with
fMRI were located in the presumed striatal targets of the
dopaminergic neurons (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al.,
2003). However, D’Ardenne and colleagues (2008) recently
reported BOLD prediction error signals in the ventral tegmental
area using fMRI. They used a combination of small voxel sizes,
cardiac gating, and a specialized normalization procedure to
detect these signals. Across two paradigms using primary and
secondary reinforcers, they found that BOLD activity in the
VTA was significantly correlated with positive, but not negative,
reward prediction errors.
Zaghloul and colleagues (2009) reported the first electrophys-
iological recordings in human substantia nigra during learning.
These investigators recorded neuronal activity while individuals
with Parkinson’s disease underwent surgery to place electrodes
for deep-brain stimulation therapy. Subjects had to learn which
of two options provided a greater probability of a hypothetical
monetary reward, and their choices were fit with a reward predic-
tion model. In the subset of neurons that were putatively dopami-
nergic, they found an increase in firing rate for unexpected
positive outcomes, relative to unexpected negative outcomes,
while the firing rates for expected outcomes did not differ
(Figures 6C and 6D). Such an encoding of unexpected rewards
is again consistent with the reward prediction error hypothesis.
Pessiglione and colleagues (2006) demonstrated a causal role
for dopaminergic signaling in both learning and striatal BOLD
prediction error signals. During an instrumental learning para-
digm, they tested subjects who had received L-DOPA (a dopa-
mine precursor), haloperidol (a dopamine receptor antagonist),
or placebo. Consistent with other findings from Parkinson’s
patients (Frank et al., 2004), L-DOPA (compared to haloperidol)
improved learning to select a more rewarding option but did
not affect learning to avoid a more punishing option. In addition,
the BOLD reward prediction error in the striatum was larger for
the L-DOPA group than for the haloperidol group, and differ-
ences in this response, when incorporated into a reinforcement
learning model, could account for differences in the speed of
learning across groups.
Stage 2: Choice
Lateral Prefrontal and Parietal Cortex: Choosing Based
on Value
Learning and encoding subjective value in a common currency
is not sufficient for decision making—one action still needs to
be chosen from among the set of alternatives and passed to
the motor system for implementation. What is the process by
which a highly valued option in a choice set is selected and
implemented?
While we acknowledge that other proposals have been made
regarding this process, we believe that the bulk of the available
evidence implicates (at a minimum) the lateral prefrontal and
parietal cortex in the process of selecting and implementing
choices from among any set of available options. Some of thebest evidence has come from studies of a well-understood
model decision making system: the visuo-saccadic system of
the monkey. For largely technical reasons, the saccadic-control
system has been intensively studied over the past three decades
as a model for understanding sensory-motor control in general
(Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Colby and Goldberg, 1999). The
same has been true for studies of choice. The lateral intraparietal
area (LIP), the frontal eye fields (FEF), and the superior colliculus
(SC) comprise the core of a heavily interconnected network that
plays a critical role in visuo-saccadic decision making (Figure 7)
(Glimcher, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). The available data
suggest a parallel role in nonsaccadic decision making for the
motor cortex, the premotor cortex, the supplementary motor
area, and the areas in the parietal cortex adjacent to LIP.
At a theoretical level, the process of choice must involve
a mechanism for comparing two or more options and identifying
the most valuable of those options. Both behavioral evidence
and theoretical models from economics make it clear that this
process is also somewhat stochastic (McFadden, 1974). If two
options have very similar subjective values, the less-desirable
option may be occasionally selected. Indeed, the probability
that these ‘‘errors’’ will occur is a smooth function of the similarity
in subjective value of the options under consideration. How then
is this implemented in the brain?
Any system that performed such a comparison must be able to
represent the values of each option before a choice is made and
then must effectively pass information about the selected option,
but not the unselected options, to downstream circuits. In the
saccadic system, among the first evidence for such a circuit
came from the work of Glimcher and Sparks (1992), who
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Figure 7. Choice Circuitry for Saccadic Decision Making
Diagram of a macaque brain, highlighting in black the regions discussed as
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Reviewessentially replicated in the superior colliculus Tanji and Evarts’
classic studies of motor area M1 (Tanji and Evarts, 1976). The
laminar structure of the superior colliculus employs a topo-
graphic map to represent the amplitude and direction of all
possible saccades. They showed that if two saccadic targets
of roughly equal subjective value were presented to a monkey,
then the two locations on this map corresponding to the two
saccades became weakly active. If one of these targets was
suddenly identified as having higher value, this led almost imme-
diately to a high-frequency burst of activity at the site associated
with that movement and a concomitant suppression of activity at
the other site. In light of preceding work (Van Gisbergen et al.,
1981), this led to the suggestion that a winner-take-all computa-
tion occurred in the colliculus that effectively selected one move-
ment from the two options for execution.
Subsequent studies (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and
Munoz, 1998) established that activity at the two candidate
movement sites, during the period before the burst, was graded.
If the probability that a saccade would yield a reward was
increased, firing rates associated with that saccade increased,
and if the probability that a saccade would yield a reward was
decreased, then the firing rate was decreased. These observa-
tions led Platt and Glimcher (1999) to test the hypothesis, just
upstream of the colliculus in area LIP, that these premovement
signals encoded the subjective values of movements. To test
that hypothesis, they systematically manipulated either the prob-
ability that a given saccadic target would yield a reward or the
magnitude of reward yielded by that target. They found that firing
rates in area LIP before the collicular burst occurred were a nearly
linear function of both magnitude and probability of reward.
This naturally led to the suggestion that the fronto-parietal
network of saccade control areas formed, in essence, a set of
topographic maps of saccade value. Each location on these
maps encodes a saccade of a particular amplitude and direction,
and it was suggested that firing rates on these maps encoded
the desirability of each of those saccades. The process of
choice, then, could be reduced to a competitive neuronal mech-
anism that identified the saccade associated with the highest
level of neuronal activity. (In fact, studies in brain slices have
largely confirmed the existence of such a mechanism in the
colliculus—see for example Isa et al., 2004, or Lee and Hall,
2006.) Many subsequent studies have bolstered this conclusion,
demonstrating that various manipulations that increase (or
decrease) the subjective value of a given saccade also increase
(or decrease) the firing rate of neurons within the frontal-parietal
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Figure 8. Relative Value Responses in LIP
LIP firing rates are greater when the larger magni-
tude reward is in the response field (n = 30) (A) but
are not affected when the magnitude of all rewards
are doubled (n = 22) (B). Adapted with permission
from Dorris and Glimcher (2004).
maps associated with that saccade
(Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Janssen and
Shadlen, 2005; Kim et al., 2008; Leon
and Shadlen, 1999, 2003; Sugrue et al.,
2004; Wallis and Miller, 2003; Yang and
Shadlen, 2007). Some of these studies have discovered one
notable caveat to this conclusion, though. Firing rates in these
areas encode the subjective value of a particular saccade rela-
tive to the values of all other saccades under consideration
(Figure 8) (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004).
Thus, unlike firing rates in orbitofrontal cortex and striatum, firing
rates in LIP (and presumably other frontal-parietal regions
involved in choice rather than valuation) are not ‘‘menu
invariant.’’ This suggests an important distinction between
activity in the parietal cortex and activity in the orbitofrontal
cortex and striatum. Orbitofrontal and striatal neurons appear
to encode absolute (and hence transitive) subjective values.
Parietal neurons, presumably using a normalization mechanism
like the one studied in visual cortex (Heeger, 1992), rescale these
absolute values so as to maximize the differences between the
available options before choice is attempted.
At the same time that these studies were underway, a second
line of evidence also suggested that the fronto-parietal networks
participate in decision making, but in this case decision making
of a slightly different kind. In these studies of perceptual decision
making, an ambiguous visual stimulus was used to indicate
which of two saccades would yield a reward, and the monkey
was reinforced if he made the indicated saccade. Shadlen and
Newsome (Shadlen et al., 1996; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001)
found that the activity of LIP neurons early in this decision-
making process carried stochastic information about the likeli-
hood that a given movement would yield a reward. Subsequent
studies have revealed the dynamics of this process. During these
kinds of perceptual decision-making tasks, the firing rates of LIP
neurons increase as the evidence that a saccade into the
response field will be rewarded accrues. However, this increase
is bounded; once firing rates cross a maximal threshold, a
saccade is initiated (Churchland et al., 2008; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002). Closely related studies in the frontal eye fields
lead to similar conclusions (Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Kim and
Shadlen, 1999). Thus, both firing rates in LIP and FEF and behav-
ioral responses in this kind of task can be captured by a race-to-
barrier diffusion model (Ratcliff et al., 1999).
Several lines of evidence now suggest that this threshold
represents a value (or evidence based) threshold for movement
selection (Kiani et al., 2008). When the value of any saccade
crosses that preset minimum, the saccade is immediately initi-
ated. Importantly, in the models derived from these data, the
intrinsic stochasticity of the circuit gives rise to the stochasticity
observed in actual choice behavior.740 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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ReviewThese two lines of evidence, one associated with the work of
Shadlen, Newsome, and their colleagues and the other associ-
ated with our research groups, describe two classes of models
for understanding the choice mechanism. In reaction-time
tasks, the race-to-barrier model describes a situation in which
a choice is made as soon as the value of any action exceeds
a preset threshold (Figures 9A and 9B). In non-reaction time
economics-style tasks, a winner-take-all model describes the
process of selecting the option having the highest value from
a set of candidates. Wang and colleagues (Lo and Wang,
2006; Wang, 2008; Wong and Wang, 2006) have recently shown
that a single collicular or parietal circuit can be designed that
performs both winner-take-all and thresholding operations in
a stochastic fashion that depends on the inhibitory tone of the
network (Figure 9C). Their models suggest that the same mech-
anism can perform two kinds of choice—a slow competitive
winner-take-all process that can identify the best of the available
options and a rapid thresholding process that selects a single
movement once some preset threshold of value is crossed.
LIP, the superior colliculus, and the frontal eye fields therefore
seem to be part of a circuit that receives as input the subjective
value of different saccades and then, representing these as
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Models of the Choice Process
Schematic of the symmetric random walk (A) and
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Schematic neural architecture and simulations
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during choice. Panels (A) and (B) reprinted with
permission from Gold and Shadlen (2007). Panel
(C) adapted with permission from Lo and Wang
(2006).
relative values, stochastically selects
from all possible saccades a single one
for implementation.
Open Questions and Current
Controversies
Above, we have outlined our conclusion
that, based on the data available today,
a minimal model of primate decision
making includes valuation circuits in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and stria-
tum and choice circuits in lateral pre-
frontal and parietal cortex. However,
there are obviously many open questions
about the details of this mechanism, as
well as many vigorous debates that go
beyond the general outline just pre-
sented. With regard to valuation, some
of the important open questions concern
what all of the many inputs to the final
common path are (i.e., Hare et al.,
2009), how the function of ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and striatum might differ
(i.e., Hare et al., 2008), and how to best
define and delineate more specific roles for subcomponents of
these large multipart structures. In terms of value learning,
current work focuses on what precise algorithmic model of rein-
forcement learning best describes the dopaminergic signal (i.e.,
Morris et al., 2006), how sophisticated the expectation of the
future rewards that is intrinsic to this signal is, whether these
signals adapt to volatility in the environment as necessary for
optimal learning (i.e., Behrens et al., 2007), and how outcomes
that are worse than expected are encoded (i.e., Bayer et al.,
2007; Daw et al., 2002). In terms of choice, some of the important
open questions concern what modulates the state of the choice
network between the thresholding and winner-take-all mecha-
nisms, what determines which particular options are passed to
the choice circuitry, whether there are mechanisms for con-
structing and editing choice sets, how the time accorded to
a decision is controlled, and whether this allocation adjusts in
response to changes in the cost of ‘‘errors.’’
While space does not permit us to review all the current work
that addresses these questions, we do want to elaborate on one
of these questions, which is perhaps the most hotly debated in
the field at present. This is whether there are multiple valuation
subsystems, and if so, how these systems are defined, howNeuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 741
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Reviewindependent or interactive they are, and how their valuations are
combined into a final valuation that determines choice. Critically,
this debate is not about whether different regions encode
subjective value in a different manner—for example, the menu-
invariant responses in orbitofrontal cortex compared to the
relative value responses in LIP. Rather, the question is whether
different systems encode different and inconsistent values for
the same actions, such that these different valuations would
lead to diverging conclusions about the best action to take.
Many proposals along these lines have been made (Balleine
et al., 2009; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Bossaerts et al.,
2009; Daw et al., 2005; Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Rangel
et al., 2008). One set builds upon a distinction made in the
psychological literature between: Pavlovian systems, which learn
a relationship between stimuli and outcomes and activate simple
approach and withdrawal responses; habitual systems, which
learn a relationship between stimuli and responses and therefore
do not adjust quickly to changes in contingency or devaluation of
rewards; and goal-directed systems, which learn a relationship
between responses and outcomes and therefore do adjust
quickly to changes in contingency or devaluation of rewards.
Another related set builds upon a distinction between model-
free reinforcement learning algorithms, which make minimal
assumptions and work on ‘‘cached’’ action values, and more
sophisticated model-based algorithms, which use more detailed
information about the structure of the environment and can
therefore adjust more quickly to changes in the environment.
These proposals usually associate the different systems with
different regions of the frontal cortex and striatum (Balleine
et al., 2009) and raise the additional question of how these
multiple valuations interact or combine to control behavior
(Daw et al., 2005). It is important to note that most of the
evidence we have reviewed here concerns decision making by
what would be characterized in much of this literature as the
‘‘goal-directed’’ system. This highlights the fact that our under-
standing of valuation circuitry is in its infancy. A critical question
going forward is how multiple valuation circuits are integrated
and how we can best account for the functional role of different
subregions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum in
valuation. While no one today knows how this debate will finally
be resolved, we can identify the resolution of these issues as crit-
ical to the forward progress of decision studies.
Another significant area of research that we have neglected in
this review concerns the function of dorsomedial prefrontal and
medial parietal circuits in decision making. Several recent
reviews have focused specifically on the role of these structures
in valuation and choice (Lee, 2008; Platt and Huettel, 2008;
Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). Some of the most recently iden-
tified and interesting electrophysiological signals have been
found in dorsal anterior cingulate (Hayden et al., 2009; Matsu-
moto et al., 2007; Quilodran et al., 2008; Seo and Lee, 2007,
2009) and the posterior cingulate (Hayden et al., 2008; McCoy
and Platt, 2005). Decision-related signals in these areas have
been found to occur after a choice has been made, in response
to feedback about the result of that choice. One key function of
these regions may therefore be in the monitoring of choice
outcomes and the subsequent adjustment of both choice
behavior and sensory acuity in response to this monitoring.742 Neuron 63, September 24, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.However, there is also evidence suggesting that parts of the
anterior cingulate may encode action-based subjective values,
in an analogous manner to the orbitofrontal encoding of
goods-based subjective values (Rudebeck et al., 2008). This reit-
erates the need for work delineating the specific functional roles
of different parts of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in valuation
and decision making.
Finally, a major topic area that we have not explicitly discussed
in detail concerns decisions where multiple agents are involved
or affected. These are situations that can be modeled using
the formal frameworks of game theory and behavioral game
theory. Many, and perhaps most, of the human neuroimaging
studies of decision making have involved social interactions
and games, and several reviews have been dedicated to these
studies (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Lee, 2008; Montague and
Lohrenz, 2007; Singer and Fehr, 2005). For our purposes, it is
important to note that the same neural mechanisms we have
described above are now known to operate during social deci-
sions (Barraclough et al., 2004; de Quervain et al., 2004; Dorris
and Glimcher, 2004; Hampton et al., 2008; Harbaugh et al.,
2007; King-Casas et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2006). Of course, these
decisions also require additional processes, such as the ability
to model other people’s minds and make inferences about
their beliefs (Adolphs, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004), and many
ongoing investigations are aimed at understanding the role of
particular brain regions in these social functions during decision
making (Hampton et al., 2008; Tankersley et al., 2007; Tomlin
et al., 2006).
Conclusion
Neurophysiological investigations over the last seven years
have begun to solidify the basic outlines of a neural mechanism
for choice. This breakneck pace of discovery makes us opti-
mistic that the field will soon be able to resolve many of the
current controversies and that it will also expand to address
some of the questions that are now completely open.
Future neurophysiological models of decision making should
prove relevant beyond the domain of basic neuroscience. Since
neurophysiological models share with economic ones the goal of
explaining choices, ultimately there should prove to be links
between concepts in the two kinds of models. For example,
the neural noise in different brain circuits might correspond to
the different kinds of stochasticity that are posited in different
classes of economic choice models (McFadden, 1974; Selten,
1975). Similarly, rewards are experienced through sensory
systems, with transducers that have both a shifting reference
point and a finite dynamic range. These psychophysically
characterized properties of sensory systems might contribute
both to the decreasing sensitivity and reference dependence
of valuations, which are both key aspects of recent economic
models (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). Moving forward, we think
the greatest promise lies in building models of choice that incor-
porate constraints from both the theoretical and mechanistic
levels of analysis.
Ultimately, such models should prove useful to questions of
human health and disease. There are already several elegant
examples of how an understanding of the neurobiological
mechanisms of decision making has provided a foundation for
Neuron
Reviewunderstanding aberrant decision making in addiction, psychi-
atric disorders, autism, and Parkinson’s disease (Bernheim and
Rangel, 2004; Chiu et al., 2008a, 2008b; Frank et al., 2004;
King-Casas et al., 2008; Redish, 2004). In the future, we feel
confident that understanding the neurobiology of decision
making also points the way toward improved treatments of these
diseases and others, where people’s choices play a key role.
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